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Heidegger without Man?  
The Ontological Basis of Lyotard’s Later Antihumanism 
Matthew R. McLennan 
University of Ottawa/Carleton University 
In the following, “antihumanism” denotes a rejection of any and all 
systems of thought and discourse wherein a universal concept of the human, 
i.e. the human as such, forms the conceptual and ethical center of the 
universe and/or history. It is widely known that Jean-François Lyotard’s 
“pagan,” “postmodern” and later works are antihumanistic in this sense; 
less often discussed is the ontological grounding of this antihumanism in 
something very close to Heidegger’s philosophy of the event, or Ereignis. In 
what follows, I will reconstruct the mature Lyotard’s antihumanism as a 
radicalization of Heidegger’s, on the grounds that a) a version of the 
philosophy of Being as Ereignis forms the ontological basis of Lyotard’s 
antihumanism, and b) he reconfigures the place of the human being with 
respect to the revelation of Being.    
An overview of my argument runs as follows. The Heidegger of the 
“Letter on ‘Humanism’” speaks of Being as Ereignis. The term is usually 
rendered in English as “event,” but in Heidegger’s particular usage it is an 
event which gathers Being to itself while clearing it to itself. Put differently, 
Ereignis would be Being as the revelation of Being to itself qua the thinking 
of Being by human beings (i.e. the region of itself which is clear to itself). 
Heidegger’s rendering of Being as Ereignis is antihumanistic inasmuch as it 
configures human beings as the place of Being qua event, but not as the 
conceptual/ethical centre of the universe and/or history. Simply put, Being 
in itself transcends human beings. But Heidegger’s antihumanism cannot be 
said to be radical or thoroughgoing, inasmuch as it accords human beings an 
essential role in the thinking of Being and thereby a special kind of destiny 
and dignity. Lyotard for his part, from at least the pagan writings onwards, 
writes in terms favourable to Heidegger’s rendering of Being as event. 
However he radicalizes Heidegger’s antihumanism in denying that human 
beings have any essential role to play with respect to Being. They are 
entirely contingent effects of the event, possessing no special destiny or 
dignity.    
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Though Lyotard did not often cite Heidegger directly as a source or 
inspiration, at least prior to Heidegger et “les juifs,” I believe my interpretation 
to be highly plausible for three reasons. First, what primary textual evidence 
there is, most notably in Le Différend, is highly favourable to the argument I 
will construct. Secondly, Lyotard’s intellectual context was awash in 
Heideggerian influence, and he undoubtedly imbibed a certain amount of 
Heideggerianism indirectly, for example via Levinas1 and Derrida, whose 
earlier post-Heideggerian philosophy I will briefly discuss. Indeed, as Luc 
Ferry and Alain Renaut have argued persuasively (if polemically), Lyotard’s 
generation of radical French philosophers – those whose thought they lump 
under the label “la pensée 68” – can be broadly characterized by their 
radicalization of the antihumanisms of several German thinkers (among 
which Heidegger is certainly counted).2 Finally, and most importantly, there 
is a striking structural homology between the antihumanisms of Lyotard 
and Heidegger, as well as between the ontological-linguistic presuppositions 
that generate them. In what follows I will favour a reconstruction of the 
homology in question, noting where, why and to what extent Lyotard and 
Heidegger differ. By way of support I will bolster my argument with textual 
and historical-philosophical evidence.   
Heideggerian Antihumanism and its Ontological Basis 
Let us begin by considering Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology,”3 
specifically with respect to the human being, as expressed in the “Letter on 
‘Humanism’.” For Heidegger, Being,4 as such, is basic: it is transcendent to 
all particular beings, it is “the transcendens pure and simple.”5 The essence of 
the human being is thus its relation to Being;6 specifically, “the human being 
essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by [B]eing.”7 More 
specifically still, human beings are the particular beings for whom Being, as 
such, is a truth (or, to the extent that the human has “fallen” and forgotten 
Being, and this is Heidegger’s concern, a question to be posed).8 This is to 
say that human beings stand in (more accurately, they are) a place or region9 
of Being that is “clear” (i.e. they stand in, or rather are, the “clearing of 
Being”).10 The clearing of being, however, is “clear” not simply for human 
beings as such (i.e. as particular beings), but in the more basic sense that in 
the clearing, Being is clear to itself; in a manner of speaking, “the clearing 
itself is [B]eing.”11  
It is, in any case, Being as transcendens (and not human beings, properly 
speaking) that “clears” the clearing. Hence human beings have a special 
place among beings, but only in the sense that Being poses the truth or the 
question of itself as or through them.12 Human beings, in Heidegger’s 
picture, therefore have a special destiny13 and thus a special dignity14 not 
shared by such beings as animals, rocks and trees. Their destiny, and their 
dignity, specifically, is to be the “shepherd” of Being15; more precisely, to be 
the region of Being that poses the question of Being and thereby guards 
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against its forgetting, holding the promise that beings might yet “appear in 
the light of [B]eing as the beings they are.”16  
Though imbued with a special dignity, the human is something of a 
vassal, charged in its essence with the care of Being,17 of which it is both a 
revealing and an anamnesis.18 This does not mean, however, that Heidegger 
is unconcerned with the human being as such. But the precise nature of his 
concern should be distinguished from humanism. For Heidegger, humanism 
is characterized as “meditating and caring, that human beings be human 
and not inhumane, ‘inhuman’, that is outside their essence. But in what does 
the humanity of the human being consist? In his essence.”19 In principle, 
then, in its concern for human essence, humanism poses questions similar to 
Heidegger’s. The difference is that relative to Heidegger’s project, 
humanism sets the bar too low and stops short in its questioning.  
Specifically, he notes the way in which past and existing humanisms 
stemming from the original Roman thinking of humanitas, such as 
Renaissance, Marxist, Sartrean and Christian humanisms, all assume “an 
already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground 
of the world, that is, of beings as a whole.”20 In other words, “[e]very 
humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the 
ground of one.” Metaphysics, while it “thinks the being of beings … does 
not think [B]eing as such, [i.e.] does not think the difference between [B]eing 
and beings.”21 The specific metaphysical interpretation of beings assumed 
by all humanisms posits the essence of the human to be that of a “rational 
animal.”22 While not false, this essential definition of the human being is 
“conditioned by metaphysics” and thus incomplete or inessential.23 
Heidegger’s own care for the essence of the human being, insofar as it digs 
to the very bedrock below the categories of “rational” and “animal” 
themselves, is therefore not, on his view, a form of humanism. It rests not, in 
other words, upon a shallow, question-begging “interpretation of beings,” 
but rather arises from a questioning of both metaphysics and the deeper 
“truth of [B]eing.”24 Humanism, insofar as it is metaphysical, “impedes the 
question [of Being] by neither recognizing nor understanding it”25; 
moreover, it “does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough” 
and therefore fails to grasp “the proper dignity of the human being.”26 
Heidegger, by contrast, claims to approach the question of human essence 
and human dignity by way of a proper assessment of metaphysics and an 
engagement in the fundamental question of Being that metaphysics forgets, 
covers over, or simply does not pose.  
It is crucial to note that for Heidegger, the standing-in-the-clearing-of-
Being proper to human beings is language. Not language as a tool or 
medium of communication; rather, language in its essential relation to 
Being.27 Here is how he puts it: “In its essence, language is not the utterance 
of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it ever be 
thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, 
M a t t h e w  R .  M c L e n n a n  |  1 2 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 2 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.607 
perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. Language is the 
clearing-concealing advent of [B]eing itself” (“concealing” because language 
clears, but as a revelation of Being, which implies “the Nothing,” it also 
partially hides what it clears).28 As Heidegger puts it elsewhere, “Language 
is the house of [B]eing”29 (later, “the house of the truth of [B]eing”; later still, 
“at once the house of [B]eing and the home of human essence”). This is to 
say that “[i]n its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who 
create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship 
accomplishes the manifestation of [B]eing insofar as they bring this 
manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their 
saying.”30 
Put differently, thinking and saying are the work of Being manifesting 
itself (to itself, as human being), and guarding against its forgetting (by 
itself, as human being). The particular way in which human beings are 
always already preceded by Being is inescapably tied to language, in its 
essential dimension; as we saw, language is “the home of the human being’s 
essence.”31 Hence, for Heidegger the human being “has” language in only a 
strictly metaphorical sense.32 He is not always successful in making this 
clear, as the above quote concerning the human bringing Being to language 
suggests. But this does not appear to indicate a blind inconsistency on 
Heidegger’s part. Like Lyotard’s, Heidegger’s project necessitates writing in 
such a way that strains the bounds of ordinary language. Since language, 
according to Heidegger, has been degraded through the history of 
metaphysics to an operational and communicative tool, “[b]efore he speaks 
the human being must first let himself be claimed again by [B]eing.”33 This 
necessitates Heidegger’s project of the recovery of thinking from and by 
means of a language degraded by metaphysics.34  
Heidegger treats this question of language specifically in a later text, 
“On the Question of Being.” There we see more of the properly philological 
dimension of his philosophical project; Heidegger submits even the term 
“Being,” insofar as we inherit it from a language degraded by metaphysics, 
to a radical questioning (going so far as to cross out the term whenever he 
must use it).35 As Spivak notes in her preface to Derrida’s Of Grammatology, 
“On the Question of Being” is considered by Derrida, a contemporary and 
philosophical fellow-traveller of Lyotard, to be the “authority” for his own 
practice of “writing under erasure” (i.e. crossing out certain terms to indicate 
that they are inadequate, but, given the state of language, necessary).36 
Derrida maintains however that despite what he perceives as Heidegger’s 
attempt to “free language from the fallacy of a fixed origin,” he still sets 
Being up as a transcendental signified, a signified to which all languages 
ultimately refer, and on top of that accords the human being a special 
relation to that signified.37 Heidegger’s, then, is not a thoroughgoing 
antihumanism. In Derrida’s words:  
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It remains that the thinking of Being, the thinking of the 
truth of Being, in the name of which Heidegger de-limits 
humanism and metaphysics, remains as thinking of man. 
Man and the name of man are not displaced in the 
question of Being such as it is put to metaphysics. Even 
less do they disappear. On the contrary, at issue is a kind 
of reevaluation or revalorization of the essence and 
dignity of man... [it is] a thinking of Being which has all 
the characteristics of a relève (Aufhebung) of humanism.38  
According to Derrida, then, Heidegger’s gesture would be radical but for the 
fact that it retains a transcendent principle as its core, and accords the 
human a special dignity thereby. Though Heideggerian in his methods and 
inspiration, Derrida attempts a thought not of Being, but of pure difference. 
He recognizes that he is left thereby to vacillate between two dissatisfying 
methods. First, a deconstruction which Heidegger practices almost 
exclusively, which does not “change terrain,” which attempts to “use against 
the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house, that is, equally in 
language.”39 Practicing deconstruction in this manner, one risks, as Derrida 
imputes to Heidegger, “ceaselessly confirming, consolidating, relifting 
(relever [Aufhebung]), at an always more certain depth, that which one 
allegedly deconstructs.”40 But the alternative is to brutally change terrain “in 
a continuous and irruptive fashion,” affirming “an absolute break and 
difference.”41 The context of Derrida’s article is 1968, and he identifies the 
latter, more Nietzschean/Dionysian method as the one most characteristic of 
French thought at the time.42 One can certainly read into this a description of 
Lyotard’s Nanterre writings, and a prescient characterization of Économie 
libidinale, Lyotard’s most uncompromisingly radical, antihumanistic and 
ethically aporetic text. Derrida nonetheless notes that this irruptive method 
has its own pitfalls: ordinary language “ceaselessly reinstates the new 
terrain on the oldest ground,” and such a “displacement” can lead one to 
unwittingly inhabit “the inside one declares one has deserted.”43 In practical 
terms, one thinks here of how the revolt of 68 largely played itself out as a 
flexible regime of capital accumulation and a shallow culture of 
consumerism, hedonism, and aestheticism.44 As such, Lyotard the libidinal 
economist’s injunction to “be in inside and forget it”45 can be flagged as 
highly problematic; indeed, as Lyotard later admits, Économie libidinale 
delivers nothing less than a “politics of capital,” an “accelerationist” rather 
than properly revolutionary philosophy.46 
Lyotardian Antihumanism and its Heideggerian Inspiration 
More could be said here about Derrida’s critical appropriation of 
Heidegger, but for my purposes the main thing to note is the following: in 
the linguistic turn which followed the libidinal phase of his thinking, 
Lyotard adopts something very close to this roughly sketched critical 
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appropriation of Heidegger. While like Heidegger, he searches for 
something in or about language which is “always already before” human 
speech and human beings, he attempts, like Derrida, not to succumb to the 
temptation to render language nihilating-transcendent or to retain some 
special, dignified place for humanity. Lyotard’s antihumanism following the 
libidinal philosophy is therefore in this respect, like Derrida’s, a 
radicalization of Heidegger’s. It is also highly idiosyncratic in some of its 
specifics. At this stage I will note its most general outlines, with respect to 
both the similarities to and the departures from its Heideggerian matrix.  
It is worth pausing however to inquire why philosophers like Lyotard 
and Derrida would attack humanism, even going so far as to purge 
Heidegger’s nominally antihumanistic philosophy of the destiny and dignity 
he accorded humanity. In quite general terms, their line of attack stems from 
the Nietzschean critique of the nihilism which dominates Western 
philosophy, in particular the notion that transcendent concepts nihilate 
concrete particulars. Quite simply: because it is a transcendent concept, 
“Humanity” may be invoked to justify all manner of atrocities aimed at 
individual human beings. Therefore humanism is pernicious and a truly 
radical philosophy will have gotten beyond it. But this raises the problem of 
how a contemporary, post-religious philosophy which jettisons humanism 
may articulate an ethics. In the wake of May 68 and the early 1970s, the 
efforts of Lyotard and Derrida may be broadly interpreted as a sustained 
engagement with this question. In this connection their considerable debt to 
Levinas should also be noted.    
These considerations shed light on why, following the ethically aporetic 
libidinal phase of his thinking, Lyotard attempted to think an ethical 
antihumanism. In the process he all but abandoned Freud’s pulsional theory 
and turned to language pragmatics as his primary material.47 Granted, to the 
extent that language pragmatics evokes images of human beings 
communicating and creating certain other linguistic effects, this may seem 
hard to square with an antihumanist project. Lyotard attempts nonetheless 
to pull off a thoroughly antihumanist linguistic turn. He seeks an 
understanding of language pragmatics which degrades the conceptual 
position of the human as such, a linguistic “revolution of relativity and of 
quantum theory,” as he puts it.48  
Lyotard casts language in such a way that human beings are no longer 
in command of it, as “language users,” or at the centre of it, as originators or 
privileged loci of discourse. This will come as a surprise to readers who 
know Lyotard through his most popular text, The Postmodern Condition, 
wherein he freely employs the later Wittgenstein’s notion of language games 
to describe the social bond. The later Lyotard purifies his terms of humanist 
residues, insisting that “[y]ou don’t play around with language … [a]nd in 
this sense, there are no language games.”49  Rather, he conceives of language 
as a kind of primal but unstable material preceding, structuring and, in a 
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sense, generating human beings. Language pragmatics, far from simply 
denoting the ways humans do things with words, is re-construed as the way 
in which language, radically heterogeneous with respect to itself but also 
always already prior to the human, does things or produces certain effects 
with humans. But as we will see, Lyotard does not view humans as an 
essential component of language pragmatics; they possess no “destiny” in 
Heidegger’s sense.  
This stems from Lyotard’s beginning to view the pragmatic dimension 
of language as a question of ontology or, better perhaps, Being-generating-
time, or Being-coming-into-being, i.e. occurrence, as and at the behest of 
Being: what Heidegger calls Ereignis, Being itself as “propriating event,” an 
event which gathers Being to itself and clears it to itself (some Anglophone 
commentators speak of Ereignis as “en-owning”); Being as pure “there is” or 
“it gives”).50 In Le Différend Lyotard interprets language in more or less 
Heideggerian fashion, appropriating the latter’s terms. Language is now 
Being, but not quite in the sense of transcendens pure and simple; it is rather 
Being, in and generating time. Language is now viewed, in other words, in 
terms of the event: Heidegger’s Ereignis, the “event of propriation.” 
Language/Being is, then, for Lyotard a phrasing, the pure “it happens,” and 
this entails not Being as a stable, pre-existent, transcendent structure 
structuring the human linguistically, but rather, as he puts it in Le Différend, 
“one being, one time,” every time.51 For Lyotard, this means that “language” 
is not simply the natural human language spoken by you and me; rather, it 
is any and every event, insofar as every event is a kind of phrasing.  
When a phrase happens, it presents at least one “universe.”52 A 
universe is a concatenation or “situation”53 of four pragmatic poles: referent 
(“what it is about, the case”), sense (“what is signified about the case”), 
addressee (“that to which or addressed to which this is signified about the 
case”), and addressor (“that ‘through’ which or in the name of which this is 
signified about the case”).54 A universe is distinguished by how its four 
poles are situated: “The disposition of a phrase universe consists in the 
situating of these instances in relation to each other. A phrase may entail 
several referents, several senses, several addressees, several addressors. 
Each of these four instances may be marked [i.e. clearly indicated, or filled in 
by something definite] in the phrase or not.”55 
A phrase presents a situation; it cannot, however, present its own 
presentation, which is to say, its presentation is not itself situated in the 
universe it presents.56 The presentation of a phrase may nonetheless be 
marked in the universe it presents by There is (il y a); since ordinary language 
can refer to itself, a phrase like “There is a presentation in the current 
phrase” marks it, but does not strictly speaking present or situate it. The 
presentation entailed by a given phrase, however, may be situated in the 
universe of another phrase.57 This is to say that when a phrase occurs, there 
is what it presents (ce qu’il y a), as well as that it presents (qu’il y a); the latter 
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may be vaguely indicated in the phrase, but it can only be situated in 
another phrase (i.e. the fact that the phrase presented something becomes a 
referent in another phrase). The il y a is the phrase in its most ontological 
dimension, and we should guard against restricting the concept of “phrase” 
to natural language. Any event may be described in these terms, since any 
event situates the four pragmatic poles described above. 
At this point it should be clear why Lyotard’s philosophy of phrases 
may be plausibly interpreted in terms of the ontological/linguistic 
dimension of Heidegger’s philosophy. But here we can ask whether for 
Lyotard, as for Heidegger, human beings constitute a particular, privileged 
“region” or “clearing” of Being. To the extent that they are addressees of the 
fact that Being, as event, “speaks” or rather phrases to them, they are 
“called” by Being, if not to “think Being” in the specifically Heideggerian 
sense, then at least to respond to the event. But more fundamentally, as we 
will see, before it can be said that they are called by Being, to respond or 
otherwise, human beings are called into being by Being, which is to say they 
are called into being by the event. As with Heidegger, human beings are for 
Lyotard transcended by Being; Lyotard interprets Being, however, as pure 
event. Hence, while it appears that he has abandoned or compromised what 
I would argue is his nearly career-long struggle against nihilating 
transcendence, Lyotard is really saying – not without inconsistency, which is 
immediately obvious – that singularity is, precisely, what is transcendent 
(and hence, singularity is still privileged), even to the extent that it is the 
transcendent condition of transcendence itself.  
Where Lyotard departs from Heidegger is with respect to the notion 
that the human being is the shepherd of Being, the region of Being 
destined/dignified to pose the question of Being and thereby to open itself 
to Being’s dispensation and guard against its forgetting. In fact, questions of 
calling or destiny are absent from Lyotard’s account of Ereignis as bare 
occurrence; inasmuch as each event can be characterized by both a 
presentation and a situation, such questions are “situational,” i.e. they are of 
the order of what is presented by the event (ce qu’il y a) but they are not of the 
event (qu’il y a), strictly speaking. In Lyotard’s estimation:  
[Heidegger] persists in making ‘man’ the addressee of the 
giving which in Ereignis gives, and gives itself while 
withholding itself, and [he] particularly persists in making 
in making the one who receives this giving into the man 
who fulfills his destiny as man by hearing the authenticity 
of time. Destiny, addressee, addressor, and man are 
instances or relations here in universes presented by 
phrases [i.e. events], they are situational, tô logo. The There 
is takes place, it is an occurrence (Ereignis), but it does not 
present anything to anyone, it does not present itself, and 
it is not the present, nor is it presence. Insofar as it is 
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phrasable (thinkable), a presentation falls short58 as an 
occurrence.59 
As Bennington interprets this passage, “Lyotard distinguishes his thinking 
about time from the later Heidegger on the Ereignis on the grounds that the 
latter still thinks time in terms of gift and destination, i.e. in terms of 
instances situated within a presented phrase-universe, rather than as the bare 
‘occurrence’ of the event of presentation of that universe.”60 As bare 
occurrence, Being does not give itself (as question, or clearing, or event) to 
the human being, without generating or having generated the human being 
by situating it pragmatically as either addressor, addressee, sense, or 
referent. In fact, the formulation of Ereignis as “there is / it gives” is already 
too loaded: it is for Lyotard, simply, a matter of the “there is,” the il y a or “il 
arrive.” As he puts it, “[p]resentation is not an act of giving (and above all 
not one coming from some Es, or some It addressed to some us, to us human 
beings).”61 Being is the pure “it happens.”62 This does not entail a stable, 
pre-existent, transcendent structure, structuring by “donations” or 
“sendings” the human being as/via language. It entails, rather, Being in 
terms of the particular phrase or utterance: i.e. “one being, one time,” every 
time.63  
This being the case, it is only sometimes true that a human being is called 
into being when Being, the event, happens; the presentation entailed by the 
event is not necessarily a presentation to a human being or human beings (or 
for that matter, a presentation from them or by them), nor is it necessarily a 
generation of the human being. The seemingly anthropocentric pragmatic 
poles of addressee and addressor of the event, Lyotard suggests, may be 
fulfilled by virtually any being.64 His account of the onto-logic of the event 
apparently leaves no special role for human beings as such. This is to say 
that whereas there is a technically antihumanist account of a particularly 
human destiny for Heidegger, there is none for Lyotard; there is only what 
appears to be a thoroughgoing antihumanism.  
If I have been successful in my reconstruction, then the homology with 
Heidegger and the nature of Lyotard’s radicalization will have both become 
clear. I also believe that my reconstruction opens at least two more paths of 
inquiry which I will have to merely indicate and not follow here: one onto 
the question of the extent to which Heidegger’s critique of the essence of 
technology influenced Lyotard’s critique of capitalism and technoscientific 
development, and one onto the question of the extent to which Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology generated his later political attentisme and 
subsequently influenced Lyotard’s own.65 It is my suspicion that Lyotard, 
one-time Left-Marxist militant, imbibed something of a poison pill in 
turning to the resources of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. For the later 
Heidegger there is no other calling for the human being than to clear the 
ground for thinking, to think, and to await in one’s thinking the 
dispensation of Being. For the later Lyotard, there is no other human project 
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but to testify to the incompleteness and dissonance of the human itself, and 
all that remains of politics is the bearing witness to the event. It is my 
suspicion that not just the ontology, but also the melancholy of the later 
Lyotard has its roots in Heidegger. 
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